[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss general and the Korean War situation in
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21
particular. The two leaders also discussed order to strengthen the Chinese-North Ko- Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates
the agenda of Zhou s visit, which included rean position at the negotiating table, Stalin in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi,
the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China s agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artil- the Chinese Communist Party s second most
first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological lery regiments to Korea. However, he warned important person, visited the Soviet Union
support to China in establishing rubber tree the Chinese not to send their air force across from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe
plantations in southern China, and the con- the 38th parallel. He believed that the Ameri- mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu s
struction of a railway from Ji nin, a city on cans were not in a position to continue a visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to
the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. prolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese- original Russian documents will certainly
The two leaders then had a long discussion North Korean side remained patient in nego- help scholars to establish a more compre-
on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai tiations while at the same time maintaining hensive and accurate understanding of the
told Stalin that China would be willing to a powerful position on the battlefield, the historical past.
end the war on acceptable conditions but Americans would sooner or later yield to But even the original Russian docu-
would not yield to unreasonable American one of the aforementioned three Communist ments could also contain important omis-
terms. In Mao s view, Zhou informed Stalin, designs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, sions. In describing Mao Zedong s first
if the Communists could demonstrate a more pp. 510-511, 520-522.) meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949,
enduring patience than the Americans, the Again, if one compares Shi Zhe s de- for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls
enemy would sooner or later make addi- scription of the meeting with the Russian that when Stalin asked Mao about the goals
tional concessions. Zhou particularly em- minutes, they are compatible even in some he hoped to achieve through the visit, Mao
phasized that it was Mao s belief that a firm small details. For example, in both records, replied, according to Shi Zhe, that For this
Communist stand in the armistice negotia- Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the trip we hope to bring about something that
tions might prolong the war in Korea but Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority not only looks nice but also tastes delicious.
would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.)
in Mao s opinion, the conflict in Korea had Yet these Russian documents do raise Indeed, this was the single most important
exposed the weakness of the United States, questions about existing Chinese sources in message Mao tried to deliver to Stalin at
and delayed the coming of a new world war. several aspects. While these Russian docu- their first meeting. The Russian minutes,
Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did ments are declassified by the Presidential however, do not include this statement. Why
have difficulties in continuing war opera- Archives in their original format, existing not? A possible answer could lie in the
tions under the current conditions, espe- Chinese sources are usually released on a cultural differences between Chinese and
cially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superi- selective basis, and published in compila- Russian interpreters. In Shi Zhe s memoirs,
ority in artillery pieces over the Communist tions rather than made available in their he mentioned that Mao made the statement
forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement original form to scholars working in ar- at the beginning of the meeting, and that the
with Mao Zedong s assessment of the situa- chives. As a result, serious omissions exist Soviets did not quite understand Mao s mean-
tion, offering to increase Soviet military in the Chinese sources. In the Russian min- ing. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a
equipment delivery to China so that the utes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Soviet Politburo member, even laughed at
Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superi- Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the Mao s expression. Is it possible that N.T.
ority in artillery fire power against the Ameri- two leaders discussed the differences be- Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes,
cans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese- tween Chinese and North Korean leaders missed the importance Mao attached to this
North Korean side should take three steps in over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi statement and treated it only as a part of
dealing with the Americans on the prisoner Zhe s memoirs, although he implied that greetings or an insignificant discussion
issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding problems existed between Beijing and of general topics ? (See the first paragraph
thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean pris- Pyongyang, he does not explain what the of the Russian minutes.)
oners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest problems were and why and how they This discrepancy or omission reminds
holding a comparable proportion of the emerged. Further, the accuracy of the infor- scholars that the post-Cold War access to
enemy s prisoners in exchange. The pur- mation provided by memoirs is subject to previously unavailable Communist docu-
pose of this suggestion was to force the the limits of human memory. In the case of mentary sources do not offer automatic an-
Americans to change their position. Second, Shi Zhe s memoirs, even with his marvelous swers to all remaining scholarly questions.
if the first design failed to work, the Chinese- memory of historical events (enhanced by They provide us with new research opportu-
North Korean side could propose a ceasefire his experience of writing confessions sev- nities, but they also require us to be more
to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. eral hundred times during the Cultural Revo- careful in treating our sources and more
Third, if the second proposal was unaccept- lution and assisted by his privileged access creative in establishing our perspectives. In
able to the Americans, the Chinese-North to archival sources), ambiguities exist and this sense, this is a new point of departure in
Korean side could make the following pro- mistakes occur. For example, comparing the study of the Cold War history.
posal: if some prisoners did not want to be Shi Zhe s account of Mao Zedong s meeting
returned, they might be temporarily main- with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both * * * * *
tained by a neutral third country, and then, the Russian records and Mao s own tele-
after their intentions were ascertained, they gram summarizing the meeting, one finds it From Consensus to Strains
would either be released or returned. In too general and ambiguous in some places. in the Sino-Soviet Alliance
22 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A Palpable Deterioration agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl karpacz24.htw.pl
It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss general and the Korean War situation in
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21
particular. The two leaders also discussed order to strengthen the Chinese-North Ko- Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates
the agenda of Zhou s visit, which included rean position at the negotiating table, Stalin in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi,
the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China s agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artil- the Chinese Communist Party s second most
first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological lery regiments to Korea. However, he warned important person, visited the Soviet Union
support to China in establishing rubber tree the Chinese not to send their air force across from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe
plantations in southern China, and the con- the 38th parallel. He believed that the Ameri- mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu s
struction of a railway from Ji nin, a city on cans were not in a position to continue a visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to
the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. prolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese- original Russian documents will certainly
The two leaders then had a long discussion North Korean side remained patient in nego- help scholars to establish a more compre-
on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai tiations while at the same time maintaining hensive and accurate understanding of the
told Stalin that China would be willing to a powerful position on the battlefield, the historical past.
end the war on acceptable conditions but Americans would sooner or later yield to But even the original Russian docu-
would not yield to unreasonable American one of the aforementioned three Communist ments could also contain important omis-
terms. In Mao s view, Zhou informed Stalin, designs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, sions. In describing Mao Zedong s first
if the Communists could demonstrate a more pp. 510-511, 520-522.) meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949,
enduring patience than the Americans, the Again, if one compares Shi Zhe s de- for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls
enemy would sooner or later make addi- scription of the meeting with the Russian that when Stalin asked Mao about the goals
tional concessions. Zhou particularly em- minutes, they are compatible even in some he hoped to achieve through the visit, Mao
phasized that it was Mao s belief that a firm small details. For example, in both records, replied, according to Shi Zhe, that For this
Communist stand in the armistice negotia- Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the trip we hope to bring about something that
tions might prolong the war in Korea but Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority not only looks nice but also tastes delicious.
would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.)
in Mao s opinion, the conflict in Korea had Yet these Russian documents do raise Indeed, this was the single most important
exposed the weakness of the United States, questions about existing Chinese sources in message Mao tried to deliver to Stalin at
and delayed the coming of a new world war. several aspects. While these Russian docu- their first meeting. The Russian minutes,
Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did ments are declassified by the Presidential however, do not include this statement. Why
have difficulties in continuing war opera- Archives in their original format, existing not? A possible answer could lie in the
tions under the current conditions, espe- Chinese sources are usually released on a cultural differences between Chinese and
cially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superi- selective basis, and published in compila- Russian interpreters. In Shi Zhe s memoirs,
ority in artillery pieces over the Communist tions rather than made available in their he mentioned that Mao made the statement
forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement original form to scholars working in ar- at the beginning of the meeting, and that the
with Mao Zedong s assessment of the situa- chives. As a result, serious omissions exist Soviets did not quite understand Mao s mean-
tion, offering to increase Soviet military in the Chinese sources. In the Russian min- ing. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a
equipment delivery to China so that the utes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Soviet Politburo member, even laughed at
Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superi- Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the Mao s expression. Is it possible that N.T.
ority in artillery fire power against the Ameri- two leaders discussed the differences be- Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes,
cans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese- tween Chinese and North Korean leaders missed the importance Mao attached to this
North Korean side should take three steps in over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi statement and treated it only as a part of
dealing with the Americans on the prisoner Zhe s memoirs, although he implied that greetings or an insignificant discussion
issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding problems existed between Beijing and of general topics ? (See the first paragraph
thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean pris- Pyongyang, he does not explain what the of the Russian minutes.)
oners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest problems were and why and how they This discrepancy or omission reminds
holding a comparable proportion of the emerged. Further, the accuracy of the infor- scholars that the post-Cold War access to
enemy s prisoners in exchange. The pur- mation provided by memoirs is subject to previously unavailable Communist docu-
pose of this suggestion was to force the the limits of human memory. In the case of mentary sources do not offer automatic an-
Americans to change their position. Second, Shi Zhe s memoirs, even with his marvelous swers to all remaining scholarly questions.
if the first design failed to work, the Chinese- memory of historical events (enhanced by They provide us with new research opportu-
North Korean side could propose a ceasefire his experience of writing confessions sev- nities, but they also require us to be more
to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. eral hundred times during the Cultural Revo- careful in treating our sources and more
Third, if the second proposal was unaccept- lution and assisted by his privileged access creative in establishing our perspectives. In
able to the Americans, the Chinese-North to archival sources), ambiguities exist and this sense, this is a new point of departure in
Korean side could make the following pro- mistakes occur. For example, comparing the study of the Cold War history.
posal: if some prisoners did not want to be Shi Zhe s account of Mao Zedong s meeting
returned, they might be temporarily main- with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both * * * * *
tained by a neutral third country, and then, the Russian records and Mao s own tele-
after their intentions were ascertained, they gram summarizing the meeting, one finds it From Consensus to Strains
would either be released or returned. In too general and ambiguous in some places. in the Sino-Soviet Alliance
22 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A Palpable Deterioration agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]