[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
inspection should be introduced. Therefore
we should adapt ourselves to the new situa-
tion.
In the first order, of course, we should,
as they say, remove the pistol from the ne-
gotiating table, in other words to dismantle
and withdraw the missiles.
Stevenson. I do not think that some
kind of protocol will be necessary, besides
the declarations that will be made in the
Security Council.
has the right of sovereignty and one must
seek its agreement on any kind of inspec-
tion on Cuban territory. It put forward five
conditions, including the demand about liq-
uidation of the American base in
Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of
the base, there are four more points in
Castro’s program, and these points are in full
agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his
letter to Khrushchev. Why don’t you want
to accept them?
Stevenson. There is only one issue
between the Soviet Union and the USA:
about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain
types of armaments under conditions of in-
spection and in the presence of the under-
standing that the supplies of this weaponry
will not be resumed. Under these conditions
the guarantees of Cuba’s security on the part
of the United States will be ensured.
Castro raised a number of other issues,
but they have nothing to do with Soviet-
American relations. In our negotiations we
should begin to consider the issues that are
within the realm of Soviet-American rela-
tions, in the framework of the understand-
ing between Khrushchev and Kennedy.
A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the ex-
change of letters between N.S. Khrushchev
and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one as-
pect and maintain silence on the other. You
dodge such issues as lifting of the block-
ade, granting the guarantees of indepen-
dence to Cuba. We believe that all this
should be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the docu-
ment where certain formulas should be re-
iterated and specified. We believe that our
negotiations should result in a document
registered in the United Nations and ap-
proved by the Security Council. Otherwise,
what is happening? The ink has not yet dried
up on the letter, but Rusk is already declar-
ing that the United States has not guaran-
teed the independence of Cuba. It was pub-
lished in your newspapers, and I read about
it on my way to New York.
Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to dis-
avow the guarantees that have been granted
in Kennedy’s letter. The press gave a wrong
interpretation to his declaration.
A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to you
to prepare jointly an appropriate document
and introduce it jointly to the Security Coun-
cil, then there will be no other interpreta-
tions.
Stevenson. I would like to say a few
words about the procedure. U Thant believes
territory, so that there would be no invasion
of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insist-
ing on that, there will be additional compli-
cations.
A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this
idea.
McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I
repeat: nothing will come out of it.
A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation
with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said
that this issue should be discussed at the
Organization of American States.
Stevenson. We believe that the ex-
change of letters between Kennedy and
Khrushchev contains concrete and clear for-
mulas. I think that there is no need for any
new understanding, except for resolution of
the issue about the inspection method. If we
fail to carry out ground inspection, let us
seek other means which would assure us that
the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the
danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that,
when the atmosphere will clear up and the
missile equipment will be withdrawn from
Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other is-
sues. Kennedy has already given appropri-
ate assurances concerning non-intervention
against Cuba, and we can confirm it.
We would like to say clearly that any
discussion of the issue about liquidation of
our base in Guantanamo is out of question.
It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the gov-
ernment of Cuba on a legal basis, and the
American people will under no circum-
stances renounce it.
A.I.Mikoyan. But the government of
Cuba puts forward this question, so it should
be discussed.
V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of
Cuba has put this question even earlier.
McCloy. We will not concede on this.
The position of Castro represents an obstacle
on the way to fulfilling commitments for-
mulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.
A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not
be an obstacle to fulfillment of these com-
mitments. The armaments we are talking
about is Soviet weaponry and it will be
evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared
that he would assist the evacuation of these
armaments.
McCloy. But he has 145 thousand sol-
diers against 10 thousand Russians. He can
obstruct the dismantling [of missiles--
trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already ob-
structing it.
A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba
318 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be
complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and
Cuba signed a joint document together with
the UN Secretary General on the basis of
the exchange of letters between N.S.
Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case,
this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba.
A decision in which Cuba is not a party will
not be binding for her. Cuba must have guar-
antees of non-intervention.
I would like to know: do you have any
ideas about forms of control? If you have
them - discuss them in the next few days
with V.V. Kuznetsov.
Stevenson. As to the territorial integ-
rity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of
Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain
types of weapons will be removed from
Cuba, the USA will make an announcement [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl karpacz24.htw.pl
inspection should be introduced. Therefore
we should adapt ourselves to the new situa-
tion.
In the first order, of course, we should,
as they say, remove the pistol from the ne-
gotiating table, in other words to dismantle
and withdraw the missiles.
Stevenson. I do not think that some
kind of protocol will be necessary, besides
the declarations that will be made in the
Security Council.
has the right of sovereignty and one must
seek its agreement on any kind of inspec-
tion on Cuban territory. It put forward five
conditions, including the demand about liq-
uidation of the American base in
Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of
the base, there are four more points in
Castro’s program, and these points are in full
agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his
letter to Khrushchev. Why don’t you want
to accept them?
Stevenson. There is only one issue
between the Soviet Union and the USA:
about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain
types of armaments under conditions of in-
spection and in the presence of the under-
standing that the supplies of this weaponry
will not be resumed. Under these conditions
the guarantees of Cuba’s security on the part
of the United States will be ensured.
Castro raised a number of other issues,
but they have nothing to do with Soviet-
American relations. In our negotiations we
should begin to consider the issues that are
within the realm of Soviet-American rela-
tions, in the framework of the understand-
ing between Khrushchev and Kennedy.
A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the ex-
change of letters between N.S. Khrushchev
and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one as-
pect and maintain silence on the other. You
dodge such issues as lifting of the block-
ade, granting the guarantees of indepen-
dence to Cuba. We believe that all this
should be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the docu-
ment where certain formulas should be re-
iterated and specified. We believe that our
negotiations should result in a document
registered in the United Nations and ap-
proved by the Security Council. Otherwise,
what is happening? The ink has not yet dried
up on the letter, but Rusk is already declar-
ing that the United States has not guaran-
teed the independence of Cuba. It was pub-
lished in your newspapers, and I read about
it on my way to New York.
Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to dis-
avow the guarantees that have been granted
in Kennedy’s letter. The press gave a wrong
interpretation to his declaration.
A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to you
to prepare jointly an appropriate document
and introduce it jointly to the Security Coun-
cil, then there will be no other interpreta-
tions.
Stevenson. I would like to say a few
words about the procedure. U Thant believes
territory, so that there would be no invasion
of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insist-
ing on that, there will be additional compli-
cations.
A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this
idea.
McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I
repeat: nothing will come out of it.
A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation
with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said
that this issue should be discussed at the
Organization of American States.
Stevenson. We believe that the ex-
change of letters between Kennedy and
Khrushchev contains concrete and clear for-
mulas. I think that there is no need for any
new understanding, except for resolution of
the issue about the inspection method. If we
fail to carry out ground inspection, let us
seek other means which would assure us that
the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the
danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that,
when the atmosphere will clear up and the
missile equipment will be withdrawn from
Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other is-
sues. Kennedy has already given appropri-
ate assurances concerning non-intervention
against Cuba, and we can confirm it.
We would like to say clearly that any
discussion of the issue about liquidation of
our base in Guantanamo is out of question.
It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the gov-
ernment of Cuba on a legal basis, and the
American people will under no circum-
stances renounce it.
A.I.Mikoyan. But the government of
Cuba puts forward this question, so it should
be discussed.
V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of
Cuba has put this question even earlier.
McCloy. We will not concede on this.
The position of Castro represents an obstacle
on the way to fulfilling commitments for-
mulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.
A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not
be an obstacle to fulfillment of these com-
mitments. The armaments we are talking
about is Soviet weaponry and it will be
evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared
that he would assist the evacuation of these
armaments.
McCloy. But he has 145 thousand sol-
diers against 10 thousand Russians. He can
obstruct the dismantling [of missiles--
trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already ob-
structing it.
A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba
318 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be
complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and
Cuba signed a joint document together with
the UN Secretary General on the basis of
the exchange of letters between N.S.
Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case,
this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba.
A decision in which Cuba is not a party will
not be binding for her. Cuba must have guar-
antees of non-intervention.
I would like to know: do you have any
ideas about forms of control? If you have
them - discuss them in the next few days
with V.V. Kuznetsov.
Stevenson. As to the territorial integ-
rity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of
Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain
types of weapons will be removed from
Cuba, the USA will make an announcement [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]