[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
further and better reasoning will remove this. Looked at from the physical point of view, the result is a
literally strengthened character, with stronger pneumatic tension.
Chrysippus in fact put considerable energy into restating Plato's psychology in terms of the Stoic
physical, unitary soul. Health in the soul, for example, he declared to be like health in the body: a matter of
proportion, harmony, and blending.[10] This clearly recalls the Republic; and in his first book on emotions
Chrysippus wrote a kind of epitome of Plato's views on the training of children and their motivations.[11]
Unfortunately,
[6] PHP 404 6K, 270 72 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 473).
[7] Chrysippus developed this at length (even the prolix Cicero finds it too lengthy; see Tusc. 4. 23).
[8] PHP 443K, 302 4 de Lacy.
[9] Cf. PHP 456 58K, 314 16 de Lacy.
[10] PHP 439 41K, 300 301 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 471).
[11] PHP 466K, 324 de Lacy. We know that he also criticized Plato extensively in a work On Justice (see Plut.
De St. repugn . 1040a 41b
(footnote continued on the next page)
108
our source for this is Galen, who fails to understand Chrysippus and is concerned to defend Plato, so we
have little helpful idea as to how Plato's talk of parts of the soul was transposed into Stoic terms.
Presumably, harmony between parts of the soul was restated as something like harmoniously unified
functioning of the whole soul in a way appropriate to all the diverse workings of its different parts and
capacities. We have one rather opaque comment from Chrysippus: "They are parts of the soul through which
its reason and disposition of its reason are constituted. And a soul is beautiful or ugly by virtue of its
hegemonikon being in this or that state with respect to its own proper division."[12]
b) Emotions as Beliefs
The Arius passage does not make much of the theory's most controversial feature: emotions are beliefs
(doxai ) or judgments (kriseis ). Our most extensive discussion of this comes from the hostile Galen, who
has injected into many interpretations two of his own claims which are patently wrong. One is that the thesis
that emotions are judgments is a willfully ludicrous and farfetched idea; the other is that it was an
innovation by Chrysippus, replacing a more reasonable view held by Zeno and Cleanthes.[13]
(footnote continued from the previous page)
[= (in part) SVF 3. 157, 313]). Note that since for the Stoics emotions involve reason, neither animals nor
children have them (PHP 392K, 260 de Lacy; 431K, 294 de Lacy); hence moral education is, strictly, training
children to come to have rational impulses.
[12] PHP 444K, 304 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 471a); trans. de Lacy with slight alterations.
[13] This latter claim has had great influence through its defense by Pohlenz (1965a, 1970), as part of his
more general thesis that Chrysippus produced a new and more "intellectualist" Stoic psychology. Pohlenz
was effectively criticized by Philippson (1937). The earlier account by Bonhoeffer (1890, esp. 262 84) is
much sounder than Pohlenz's account; after long neglect it is beginning to be influential again. See also
Ioppolo (1972); Glibert-Thirry (1977); Lloyd (1978); Inwood (1985).
109
Emotions can be said to be beliefs in just the same way that any impulse can; thus there is no problem, as
Galen pretends there is, with combining the thesis that emotions are beliefs with the thesis that they are
excessive impulses. Assent to a statement articulating the content of the "impulsory" appearance is part of
49 of 151 8/6/2006 1:30 PM
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft958009gj&chunk.id=0&doc.v...
every impulse;[14] in assenting to the statement the agent is committing herself to a corresponding practical
belief. We have seen that impulses could actually be called assents, and this is clearly why they are
sometimes called beliefs.
Galen more than once claims that Chrysippus contradicted Zeno on this issue,[15] and that Chrysippus
said that emotions are judgments whereas Zeno thought them "contractions," "relaxations," "elations,"
"depressions," and the like, which "supervene" on judgments. But we can see from one incautious passage
that Galen is being dishonest here.[16] We shall shortly see that Zeno's account of the "fresh" opinion
actually demands that emotions be judgments. It is clear that for the Stoics emotions have to be interpreted
in many ways: as movements, as impulses, as beliefs. Clearly, Zeno laid less stress than did Chrysippus on
the belief element; but we have no grounds to suppose a change of doctrine.
[14] Of every impulse 1, that is, the broader conception that includes impulse 2 and assent. Could one
perhaps defend what look like blatant mistakes or misrepresentations on Galen's part by arguing that he is
sometimes thinking of impulse 1 and sometimes of impulse 2, and that this is legitimate, since the Stoics do
not explicitly distinguish them? I do not think that this is any excuse. The Stoic position is quite clear: they
have in mind impulse 1, the whole phenomenon, and in different contexts emphasize one or another part of
it. The only confusion seems to be Galen's own.
[15] PHP 367K, 240 de Lacy; 377K, 246 de Lacy; 429K, 292 de Lacy; cf. SVF 1. 209.
[16] PHP 478K, 334 de Lacy. Zeno's view, Galen says, can be interpreted more than one way, either as
Chrysippean or as Platonic. Galen himself is obsessed with conforming the views of everyone but Chrysippus
to Plato's, and his view here is almost certainly not reasonable; but at least we find him admitting that it is
possible to interpret Zeno and Chrysippus as holding the same view.
110
Some phenomena will cause trouble for a theory that emotions are beliefs; for sometimes we feel fear,
elation, or depression, while lacking any appropriate belief. We may even have a firm belief that there is
nothing to fear, and still wince. But this familiar phenomenon is not a real difficulty for the Stoics; for the
absence of belief precisely disinclines us to think that here we have an emotion. These are distinct, though
related, phenomena, which came at some point to be called propatheiai, "pre-emotions."[17]
c) Emotions as Involving a "Fresh" Belief
The Arius passage preserves this point in obviously incomplete form, but it can be pieced together from
other sources. The belief aspect of the emotion was analyzed into two parts. As Cicero puts it, "it has been
adequately stated that distress is a belief about a present evil, a belief including this: that it is right to feel
distress."[18] This is, he adds, Zeno's addition of a "fresh" (recens ) belief to the belief about evil. This fits [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl karpacz24.htw.pl
further and better reasoning will remove this. Looked at from the physical point of view, the result is a
literally strengthened character, with stronger pneumatic tension.
Chrysippus in fact put considerable energy into restating Plato's psychology in terms of the Stoic
physical, unitary soul. Health in the soul, for example, he declared to be like health in the body: a matter of
proportion, harmony, and blending.[10] This clearly recalls the Republic; and in his first book on emotions
Chrysippus wrote a kind of epitome of Plato's views on the training of children and their motivations.[11]
Unfortunately,
[6] PHP 404 6K, 270 72 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 473).
[7] Chrysippus developed this at length (even the prolix Cicero finds it too lengthy; see Tusc. 4. 23).
[8] PHP 443K, 302 4 de Lacy.
[9] Cf. PHP 456 58K, 314 16 de Lacy.
[10] PHP 439 41K, 300 301 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 471).
[11] PHP 466K, 324 de Lacy. We know that he also criticized Plato extensively in a work On Justice (see Plut.
De St. repugn . 1040a 41b
(footnote continued on the next page)
108
our source for this is Galen, who fails to understand Chrysippus and is concerned to defend Plato, so we
have little helpful idea as to how Plato's talk of parts of the soul was transposed into Stoic terms.
Presumably, harmony between parts of the soul was restated as something like harmoniously unified
functioning of the whole soul in a way appropriate to all the diverse workings of its different parts and
capacities. We have one rather opaque comment from Chrysippus: "They are parts of the soul through which
its reason and disposition of its reason are constituted. And a soul is beautiful or ugly by virtue of its
hegemonikon being in this or that state with respect to its own proper division."[12]
b) Emotions as Beliefs
The Arius passage does not make much of the theory's most controversial feature: emotions are beliefs
(doxai ) or judgments (kriseis ). Our most extensive discussion of this comes from the hostile Galen, who
has injected into many interpretations two of his own claims which are patently wrong. One is that the thesis
that emotions are judgments is a willfully ludicrous and farfetched idea; the other is that it was an
innovation by Chrysippus, replacing a more reasonable view held by Zeno and Cleanthes.[13]
(footnote continued from the previous page)
[= (in part) SVF 3. 157, 313]). Note that since for the Stoics emotions involve reason, neither animals nor
children have them (PHP 392K, 260 de Lacy; 431K, 294 de Lacy); hence moral education is, strictly, training
children to come to have rational impulses.
[12] PHP 444K, 304 de Lacy (= SVF 3. 471a); trans. de Lacy with slight alterations.
[13] This latter claim has had great influence through its defense by Pohlenz (1965a, 1970), as part of his
more general thesis that Chrysippus produced a new and more "intellectualist" Stoic psychology. Pohlenz
was effectively criticized by Philippson (1937). The earlier account by Bonhoeffer (1890, esp. 262 84) is
much sounder than Pohlenz's account; after long neglect it is beginning to be influential again. See also
Ioppolo (1972); Glibert-Thirry (1977); Lloyd (1978); Inwood (1985).
109
Emotions can be said to be beliefs in just the same way that any impulse can; thus there is no problem, as
Galen pretends there is, with combining the thesis that emotions are beliefs with the thesis that they are
excessive impulses. Assent to a statement articulating the content of the "impulsory" appearance is part of
49 of 151 8/6/2006 1:30 PM
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft958009gj&chunk.id=0&doc.v...
every impulse;[14] in assenting to the statement the agent is committing herself to a corresponding practical
belief. We have seen that impulses could actually be called assents, and this is clearly why they are
sometimes called beliefs.
Galen more than once claims that Chrysippus contradicted Zeno on this issue,[15] and that Chrysippus
said that emotions are judgments whereas Zeno thought them "contractions," "relaxations," "elations,"
"depressions," and the like, which "supervene" on judgments. But we can see from one incautious passage
that Galen is being dishonest here.[16] We shall shortly see that Zeno's account of the "fresh" opinion
actually demands that emotions be judgments. It is clear that for the Stoics emotions have to be interpreted
in many ways: as movements, as impulses, as beliefs. Clearly, Zeno laid less stress than did Chrysippus on
the belief element; but we have no grounds to suppose a change of doctrine.
[14] Of every impulse 1, that is, the broader conception that includes impulse 2 and assent. Could one
perhaps defend what look like blatant mistakes or misrepresentations on Galen's part by arguing that he is
sometimes thinking of impulse 1 and sometimes of impulse 2, and that this is legitimate, since the Stoics do
not explicitly distinguish them? I do not think that this is any excuse. The Stoic position is quite clear: they
have in mind impulse 1, the whole phenomenon, and in different contexts emphasize one or another part of
it. The only confusion seems to be Galen's own.
[15] PHP 367K, 240 de Lacy; 377K, 246 de Lacy; 429K, 292 de Lacy; cf. SVF 1. 209.
[16] PHP 478K, 334 de Lacy. Zeno's view, Galen says, can be interpreted more than one way, either as
Chrysippean or as Platonic. Galen himself is obsessed with conforming the views of everyone but Chrysippus
to Plato's, and his view here is almost certainly not reasonable; but at least we find him admitting that it is
possible to interpret Zeno and Chrysippus as holding the same view.
110
Some phenomena will cause trouble for a theory that emotions are beliefs; for sometimes we feel fear,
elation, or depression, while lacking any appropriate belief. We may even have a firm belief that there is
nothing to fear, and still wince. But this familiar phenomenon is not a real difficulty for the Stoics; for the
absence of belief precisely disinclines us to think that here we have an emotion. These are distinct, though
related, phenomena, which came at some point to be called propatheiai, "pre-emotions."[17]
c) Emotions as Involving a "Fresh" Belief
The Arius passage preserves this point in obviously incomplete form, but it can be pieced together from
other sources. The belief aspect of the emotion was analyzed into two parts. As Cicero puts it, "it has been
adequately stated that distress is a belief about a present evil, a belief including this: that it is right to feel
distress."[18] This is, he adds, Zeno's addition of a "fresh" (recens ) belief to the belief about evil. This fits [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]