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peace it appears either as merely an external constraint effected by the ruling power on
private life through direct influence of higher authority, or a blind uncomprehended result
of self-seeking. This ideality has its proper actuality only in the state's situation of war or
exigency, such that here its essence is expressed as the actual, existent state's situation of
war and exigency, while its 'peaceful' situation is precisely the war and exigency of
self-seeking.
Accordingly, sovereignty, the ideality of the state, exists merely as internal necessity, as
idea. And Hegel is satisfied with that because it is a question merely of the idea.
Sovereignty thus exists on the one hand only as unconscious, blind substance. We will
become equally well acquainted with its other actuality.
§ 279. Sovereignty, at first simply the universal thought of this ideality, comes into
existence only as subjectivity sure of itself, as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one. The truth of
subjectivity, however, is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality only in a
person; and in a constitution which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each
of the three moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation.
Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a
single individual, the monarch.
1. Sovereignty, at first simply the universal thought of this ideality, comes into existence
only as subjectivity sure of itself.. The truth of subjectivity is attained only in a subject,
and the truth of personality only in a person. In a constitution which has become mature
as a realisation of rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has ... explicitly
actual and separate formation.
2. Sovereignty comes into existence only ... as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one ... (and in a
constitution which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each of the three
moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation). Hence this
absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a single
individual, the monarch.
The first sentence says only that the universal thought of this ideality, whose sorry
existence we have just seen, would have to be the self-conscious work of subjects and, as
such, exist for and in them.
Had Hegel started with the real subjects as the bases of the state it would not have been
necessary for him to let the state become subjectified in a mystical way. 'However, the
truth of subjectivity', says Hegel, 'is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality
only in a person.' This too is a mystification. Subjectivity is a characteristic of subjects
and personality a characteristic of the person. Instead of considering them to be
predicates of their subjects' Hegel makes the predicates independent and then lets them be
subsequently and mysteriously converted into their subjects.
The existence of the predicate is the subject; thus the subject is the existence of
subjectivity, etc. Hegel makes the predicates, the object. independent, but independent as
separated from their real independence, their subject. Subsequently, and because of this,
the real subject appears to be the result; whereas one has to start from the real subject and
examine its objectification. The mystical substance becomes the real subject and the real
subject appears to be something else, namely a moment of the mystical substance.
Precisely because Hegel starts from the predicates of universal determination instead of
from the real Ens (hypokimenou, subject), and because there must be a bearer of this
determination, the mystical idea becomes this bearer. This is the dualism: Hegel does not
consider the universal to be the actual essence of the actual, finite thing, i.e. of the
existing determinate thing, nor the real Ens to be the true subject of the infinite.
Accordingly, sovereignty, the essence of the state, is here first conceived to be an
independent being; it is objectified. Then, of course, this object must again become
subject. However the subject then appears to be a self-incarnation of sovereignty, which
is nothing but the objectified spirit of the state's subjects.
This basic defect of the development aside, let us consider the first sentence of the
paragraph. As it stands it says nothing more than that sovereignty, the ideality of the state
as person, as subject, exists evidently as many persons, many subjects, since no single
person absorbs in himself the sphere of personality, nor any single subject the sphere of
subjectivity. What kind of ideality of the state would it have to be which, instead of being
the actual self-consciousness of the citizens and the communal soul of the state, were one
person, one subject [?] Nor has Hegel developed any more with this sentence. But
consider now the second sentence which is joined with this one. What is important to
Hegel is representing the monarch as the actual, 'God-man', the actual incarnation of the
Idea.
§ 279. Sovereignty ... comes into existence only ... as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one... In a constitution
which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each of the three moments of the
concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation. Hence this absolutely decisive
moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a single individual, the monarch.
We previously called attention to this sentence. The moment of deciding, of arbitrary yet
determinate decision is the sovereign power of will in general. The idea of sovereign
power, as Hegel develops it, is nothing other than the idea of the arbitrary, of the will's
decision.
But even while conceiving of sovereignty as the ideality of the state, the actual
determination of the part through the idea of the whole, Hegel now makes it 'the will's
abstract and to that extent ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is
rooted. This is the strictly individual aspect of the state'. Before, the discussion was about
subjectivity, now it's about individuality. The state as sovereign must be one, one
individual, it must possess individuality. The state is one not stay in this individuality;
individuality is only the natural moment of its oneness, the state's determination as nature
[Naturbestimmung]. 'Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not
individuality in general, but a single individual, the monarch.' How so? Because 'each of
the three moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation'. One [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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peace it appears either as merely an external constraint effected by the ruling power on
private life through direct influence of higher authority, or a blind uncomprehended result
of self-seeking. This ideality has its proper actuality only in the state's situation of war or
exigency, such that here its essence is expressed as the actual, existent state's situation of
war and exigency, while its 'peaceful' situation is precisely the war and exigency of
self-seeking.
Accordingly, sovereignty, the ideality of the state, exists merely as internal necessity, as
idea. And Hegel is satisfied with that because it is a question merely of the idea.
Sovereignty thus exists on the one hand only as unconscious, blind substance. We will
become equally well acquainted with its other actuality.
§ 279. Sovereignty, at first simply the universal thought of this ideality, comes into
existence only as subjectivity sure of itself, as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one. The truth of
subjectivity, however, is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality only in a
person; and in a constitution which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each
of the three moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation.
Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a
single individual, the monarch.
1. Sovereignty, at first simply the universal thought of this ideality, comes into existence
only as subjectivity sure of itself.. The truth of subjectivity is attained only in a subject,
and the truth of personality only in a person. In a constitution which has become mature
as a realisation of rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has ... explicitly
actual and separate formation.
2. Sovereignty comes into existence only ... as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one ... (and in a
constitution which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each of the three
moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation). Hence this
absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a single
individual, the monarch.
The first sentence says only that the universal thought of this ideality, whose sorry
existence we have just seen, would have to be the self-conscious work of subjects and, as
such, exist for and in them.
Had Hegel started with the real subjects as the bases of the state it would not have been
necessary for him to let the state become subjectified in a mystical way. 'However, the
truth of subjectivity', says Hegel, 'is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality
only in a person.' This too is a mystification. Subjectivity is a characteristic of subjects
and personality a characteristic of the person. Instead of considering them to be
predicates of their subjects' Hegel makes the predicates independent and then lets them be
subsequently and mysteriously converted into their subjects.
The existence of the predicate is the subject; thus the subject is the existence of
subjectivity, etc. Hegel makes the predicates, the object. independent, but independent as
separated from their real independence, their subject. Subsequently, and because of this,
the real subject appears to be the result; whereas one has to start from the real subject and
examine its objectification. The mystical substance becomes the real subject and the real
subject appears to be something else, namely a moment of the mystical substance.
Precisely because Hegel starts from the predicates of universal determination instead of
from the real Ens (hypokimenou, subject), and because there must be a bearer of this
determination, the mystical idea becomes this bearer. This is the dualism: Hegel does not
consider the universal to be the actual essence of the actual, finite thing, i.e. of the
existing determinate thing, nor the real Ens to be the true subject of the infinite.
Accordingly, sovereignty, the essence of the state, is here first conceived to be an
independent being; it is objectified. Then, of course, this object must again become
subject. However the subject then appears to be a self-incarnation of sovereignty, which
is nothing but the objectified spirit of the state's subjects.
This basic defect of the development aside, let us consider the first sentence of the
paragraph. As it stands it says nothing more than that sovereignty, the ideality of the state
as person, as subject, exists evidently as many persons, many subjects, since no single
person absorbs in himself the sphere of personality, nor any single subject the sphere of
subjectivity. What kind of ideality of the state would it have to be which, instead of being
the actual self-consciousness of the citizens and the communal soul of the state, were one
person, one subject [?] Nor has Hegel developed any more with this sentence. But
consider now the second sentence which is joined with this one. What is important to
Hegel is representing the monarch as the actual, 'God-man', the actual incarnation of the
Idea.
§ 279. Sovereignty ... comes into existence only ... as the will's abstract and to that extent
ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly
individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state one... In a constitution
which has become mature as a realisation of rationality, each of the three moments of the
concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation. Hence this absolutely decisive
moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but a single individual, the monarch.
We previously called attention to this sentence. The moment of deciding, of arbitrary yet
determinate decision is the sovereign power of will in general. The idea of sovereign
power, as Hegel develops it, is nothing other than the idea of the arbitrary, of the will's
decision.
But even while conceiving of sovereignty as the ideality of the state, the actual
determination of the part through the idea of the whole, Hegel now makes it 'the will's
abstract and to that extent ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is
rooted. This is the strictly individual aspect of the state'. Before, the discussion was about
subjectivity, now it's about individuality. The state as sovereign must be one, one
individual, it must possess individuality. The state is one not stay in this individuality;
individuality is only the natural moment of its oneness, the state's determination as nature
[Naturbestimmung]. 'Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not
individuality in general, but a single individual, the monarch.' How so? Because 'each of
the three moments of the concept has its explicitly actual and separate formation'. One [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]