[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
The Administration was obliged to quickly
make some adjustments in its position (par-
ticularly in light of the speech of L.I.
Brezhnev, and also our answer in Pravda to
Carter’s speech in Annapolis, which he had
found to be unexpectedly firm). The Presi-
dent, having let Vance go out front, decided
to restrain Brzezinski a bit. Vance usually
stresses the positive accomplishments in
Soviet-American relations without leaving
out, however, the negative things which are
associated with Carter himself (for example,
the notorious policy of “defense of human
rights” or “dissidents”).
2. Consequently, insofar as it is pos-
sible to judge on the basis of information
which the Embassy has at its disposal, the
Carter Administration has come to its own
variety of a selective, half-hearted concep-
tion of detente (of which Brzezinski him-
self first accused us). Detente in its current
concrete application by the White House is,
as if, being partitioned. It is seen as impor-
tant and necessary—in support of the na-
tional interests of the United States itself and
the corresponding formation of public opin-
ion—regarding problems associated with
nuclear weapons, issues of war and peace
(limitation of strategic weapons, a total ban
on nuclear tests, certain other disarmament-
related issues). As far as the majority of
other questions is concerned, as in the past
it is applied subject to the “behavior” of the
Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East,
in relation to “human rights,” and so on. The
reaction of the Administration to the re-
cently-begun Shcharansky process is in this
regard sufficiently instructive.
The Carter Administration variously
denies that it is supporting a return to the
“Cold War.” It seems that it fears a decline
of relations with the Soviet Union to a level
when the threat of a serious, to say nothing
of a military, conflict with us would be in-
terpreted by the American people, and also
in other countries of the world, as something
real. Carter, evidently has come to realize
that this would cause deep alarm among the
population of the country and would for him
be a political loss, and maybe would repre-
sent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential
elections. In this regard the choice—”co-
operation or confrontation”—which he tried
to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis,
seemed in its essence directed in the USA
itself to him personally; the heartland is ex-
pecting from Carter himself an answer to
that choice, and he—thanks to the adher-
ence to principle in our position—has turned
out to have not quite as free a choice as he
tried to present it.
Overall, having moved to an obvious
lowering of the level of relations with the
Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has
shown lately a desire to smooth them out a
little. This however, should so far be un-
derstood like this, that although it is not gen-
erally averse to improving them, the White
House at the same time does not want to
sacrifice such irritants to our relations as
efforts to interfere in our internal affairs or
actions like Carter’s planned visit to the
“Berlin Wall.” In a word, the Administra-
tion itself has imposed a definite barrier to
the possible improvement in our relations
(which coincides with the tasks of strength-
ening NATO, the arms race, the game with
China, and so forth).
120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A lot depends, of course, on how the
President himself will behave in the future.
His views on Soviet-American relations, as
in the past, are inconsistent, they contain
plenty of dribs of this and drabs of that.
Flirting with the conservative moods in the
country (the strength of which he at times
clearly overestimates), Carter frequently
resorts to anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to, as
they say, win cheap applause. The danger
is found in the fact that such rhetoric is
picked up and amplified by the means of
mass communication, in Congress, and so
forth. Ultimately, as often happens in the
USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl karpacz24.htw.pl
The Administration was obliged to quickly
make some adjustments in its position (par-
ticularly in light of the speech of L.I.
Brezhnev, and also our answer in Pravda to
Carter’s speech in Annapolis, which he had
found to be unexpectedly firm). The Presi-
dent, having let Vance go out front, decided
to restrain Brzezinski a bit. Vance usually
stresses the positive accomplishments in
Soviet-American relations without leaving
out, however, the negative things which are
associated with Carter himself (for example,
the notorious policy of “defense of human
rights” or “dissidents”).
2. Consequently, insofar as it is pos-
sible to judge on the basis of information
which the Embassy has at its disposal, the
Carter Administration has come to its own
variety of a selective, half-hearted concep-
tion of detente (of which Brzezinski him-
self first accused us). Detente in its current
concrete application by the White House is,
as if, being partitioned. It is seen as impor-
tant and necessary—in support of the na-
tional interests of the United States itself and
the corresponding formation of public opin-
ion—regarding problems associated with
nuclear weapons, issues of war and peace
(limitation of strategic weapons, a total ban
on nuclear tests, certain other disarmament-
related issues). As far as the majority of
other questions is concerned, as in the past
it is applied subject to the “behavior” of the
Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East,
in relation to “human rights,” and so on. The
reaction of the Administration to the re-
cently-begun Shcharansky process is in this
regard sufficiently instructive.
The Carter Administration variously
denies that it is supporting a return to the
“Cold War.” It seems that it fears a decline
of relations with the Soviet Union to a level
when the threat of a serious, to say nothing
of a military, conflict with us would be in-
terpreted by the American people, and also
in other countries of the world, as something
real. Carter, evidently has come to realize
that this would cause deep alarm among the
population of the country and would for him
be a political loss, and maybe would repre-
sent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential
elections. In this regard the choice—”co-
operation or confrontation”—which he tried
to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis,
seemed in its essence directed in the USA
itself to him personally; the heartland is ex-
pecting from Carter himself an answer to
that choice, and he—thanks to the adher-
ence to principle in our position—has turned
out to have not quite as free a choice as he
tried to present it.
Overall, having moved to an obvious
lowering of the level of relations with the
Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has
shown lately a desire to smooth them out a
little. This however, should so far be un-
derstood like this, that although it is not gen-
erally averse to improving them, the White
House at the same time does not want to
sacrifice such irritants to our relations as
efforts to interfere in our internal affairs or
actions like Carter’s planned visit to the
“Berlin Wall.” In a word, the Administra-
tion itself has imposed a definite barrier to
the possible improvement in our relations
(which coincides with the tasks of strength-
ening NATO, the arms race, the game with
China, and so forth).
120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
A lot depends, of course, on how the
President himself will behave in the future.
His views on Soviet-American relations, as
in the past, are inconsistent, they contain
plenty of dribs of this and drabs of that.
Flirting with the conservative moods in the
country (the strength of which he at times
clearly overestimates), Carter frequently
resorts to anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to, as
they say, win cheap applause. The danger
is found in the fact that such rhetoric is
picked up and amplified by the means of
mass communication, in Congress, and so
forth. Ultimately, as often happens in the
USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]